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Cranes, Claims and a Statutory Right of User 
 
In larger developments there is potential for construction cranes to encroach into 
the airspace of neighbouring properties.  To resolve issues of this nature, a 
statutory right of user may be sought under s 180 of the Property Law Act 1974 
(Qld).  Section 180 allows the court to impose a statutory right of user on servient 
land where it is reasonably necessary in the interests of effective use in any 
reasonable manner of the dominant land.  Such an order will not be made unless 
the court is satisfied that it is consistent with public interest, the owner of the 
servient land can be adequately recompensed for any loss or disadvantage 
which may be suffered from the imposition and the owner of the servient land has 
refused unreasonably to agree to accept the imposition of that obligation. 
 
In applying the statutory provision, a key practical concern for legal advisers will 
be the basis for assessment of compensation.  A recent decision of the 
Queensland Supreme Court (Douglas J) provides guidance concerning matters 
relevant to this assessment.  The decision is Lang Parade Pty Ltd v Peluso 
[2005] QSC 112. 
 
The Facts 
 
The applicant had spent more than $11 million building two apartment towers on 
a parcel of land in Auchenflower, Brisbane.  Two electric tower cranes were used 
on the building site.  The applicant sought relief under s 180 by the imposition of 
a statutory right of user by way of a temporary licence permitting it to use 
airspace more than 25 metres above properties owned by the respondents.  This 
would permit the continued use of the two existing cranes in the development.  
The evidence established that it would be difficult to further construct the 
development without this permission.  The respondents refused permission.  The 
principal ground for this refusal was that the respondents had not been offered as 
much money as they wished to receive for the grant. 
 
The applicant had initially offered the respondents $5,000 for their permission.  
By the trial, the respondents had rejected further offers of compensation in 
amounts of $16,250, $30,000 plus costs and $35,000 plus costs respectively. 
 
In rejecting these offers, the respondents’ contention was that it was not 
unreasonable for them to require payment bearing some relationship to the 
financial gain or saving which the applicant would achieve by the use of the 
airspace.  In this regard, the likely saving to the applicant was estimated at 
$219,000. 
 
It was accepted that the existing cranes were only needed for a relatively brief 
period of time.  It was also accepted that the cranes were not used to carry loads 
over the neighbouring properties, the cranes were well maintained and the 
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applicant maintained a policy of insurance with general liability coverage for a 
single occurrence of $50 million. 
 
The Issue 
 
Section 180(3)(b) requires the court to be satisfied that the owner of the servient 
land can be recompensed adequately for any loss or disadvantage which the 
owner may suffer from the imposition of the obligation.  Section 180(4) goes on 
to provide that an order under the section shall include provision for payment by 
the applicant of such amount by way of ‘compensation or consideration’ as in the 
circumstances appears to the court to be just. 
 
The determination of adequate recompense was the main issue in this litigation. 
 
For the respondents, it was submitted that the statutory reference to the words 
‘or consideration’ mean that payment could be measured, not simply by 
assessing what was payable as compensation in the strict sense, but in a way 
that could extend beyond, for example, the diminution in the value of the land to 
include all factors of benefit or detriment on either side, including any increase in 
the profitability of the applicant’s commercial venture.  If this submission were 
accepted, the likely saving to the applicant of $219,000 would be relevant in the 
determination of adequate recompense. 
 
For the applicant, it was submitted that what was required was a causal 
relationship between the loss or disadvantage for which compensation was 
claimed and the imposition of the statutory right of user.  The applicant submitted 
that the respondents were unable to point to any disadvantage caused by the 
temporary imposition of the right of user for the cranes beyond the loss of a 
tenant who, in fact, left for reasons not associated with the presence of the 
cranes. 
 
The Decision 
 
Douglas J did not accept the respondents’ submission that the saving to the 
applicant was an appropriate starting point to measure the recompense for loss 
or disadvantage or the compensation or consideration that would be just to be 
paid to the respondents.  In rejecting this submission, Douglas J referred with 
approval to the rationale adopted by Windeyer J in Goodwin v Yee Holdings Pty 
Ltd (1997) 8 BPR 15,795 at 15,801 as follows: 
 
 Clearly what is to be compensated is the loss arising from the compulsory acquisition or 
 imposition of the easement; that is the loss of property arising from the taking out of the 
 freehold estate the incorporeal proprietary interest of the easement.  It is not 
 compensation to be equated with or apportioned out of the gain to the dominant owner as 
 a result of the imposition. 
 
Rather, the correct approach was: 
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 to try to put oneself into the position of reasonable persons negotiating for the right of use 
 of the air space trying their best to establish the amount of the consideration that will 
 compensate the owner of the air space for any loss or disadvantage it may suffer by the 
 trespass. (at [40]) 
 
Adopting this approach, and noting that the application involved a temporary 
effect which was insignificant in the absence of damage to the property or loss of 
tenants, Douglas J held that an appropriate figure was $20,000. 
 
Comment 
 
In this instance the respondents were clearly seeking to obtain a commercial 
result commensurate, in part, with the substantial savings that the applicant 
would undoubtedly achieve by being permitted to trespass.  In rejecting this 
suggested construction of s 180(4), Douglas J made it clear that the adequate 
recompense meant for an adjoining owner ‘should not be used as a means of a 
developer being held to ransom.’ (at [33]) 
 
It is suggested, with respect, that this approach is eminently sensible.  The 
approach is also consistent with that adopted in New South Wales.  As observed 
by Douglas J: 
 
 there is sense in the approach adopted in New South Wales that the statute was not 
designed to compensate the servient owner for the loss of the opportunity to extract 
money which would have been available had s 180 not been enacted.  Otherwise there 
would have been little point in the legislation.  Its primary focus is on compensation or 
consideration for loss or disadvantage. (at [36]) 
 
In short, as it relates to the application of s 180 of the Property Law Act 1974 
(Qld), greed is not always good. 
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